LIV Golf had billions of dollars behind it, some of professional golf’s biggest names on its roster, and the ambition to challenge the PGA Tour’s dominance. Basically, it had everything a league could ask for to flourish. Yet, less than five years after its launch, the Saudi-backed circuit is preparing to wind down its operations. According to former European Ryder Cup captain Paul McGinley, the outcome reflects a problem that existed long before its financial backers walked away.

As Golf by TourMiss noted, McGinley believes LIV Golf was built on fundamentally flawed assumptions about professional golf.

“I think it was based on bad fundamentals, I think that was the main thing. LIV Golf had an idea that team events was going to work in an individual sport that golf is. They also took on the might of America, but as Warren Buffett would say in business terms, ‘don’t bet against Uncle Sam,’” the Irishman said while speaking on RTÉ Radio One’s Morning Ireland.

McGinley highlighted another connected mistake that finally led to this result.

“Ultimately, it wasn’t thought through well and it wasn’t a great idea. It was also a flawed business model with really bad advice that the Saudis got in terms of the power that they were taking on,” he added.

LIV Golf’s business model revolved around team golf. Its first stage was to recruit established golfers through lucrative contracts and guaranteed paydays. The league spent millions on initial contracts and offered a collective purse of $25 million at each event, later increasing it to $30 million.

Then it intended to create teams that could become investable franchises.

The former Ryder Cup captain identified two key flaws in this model. The first was betting on teams for an individual sport, and the second was relying heavily on money.

However, the PGA Tour had the means to compete with the breakaway league.

“They went head-to-head, toe-to-toe with corporate America, which is the backbone of the PGA Tour, and came out on the wrong side of that. But they were incredibly strong and able to move the financial needle in order to stand toe-to-toe with the Saudis,” McGinley added.

Only after LIV Golf’s launch did the PGA Tour significantly increase its event purses. The Tour also introduced Signature Events with $20 million purses to prevent LIV Golf from poaching more elite names.

McGinley had questioned LIV’s commercial viability months earlier. Speaking to The Irish Times in April, he admitted that the league’s business model had never made commercial sense to him.

The Irishman questioned how LIV had managed to continue operating for so long despite its substantial financial requirements. McGinley also warned that the league’s spending had created problems for the wider professional game.

He is not alone in questioning LIV Golf’s economic foundations, as Rory McIlroy raised the same question.

“They created a false economy within men’s professional golf,” the six-time major champion said in an interview with The Scotsman.

He explained that it created a competitive environment in which established tours felt pressure to raise their own prize funds. But he also acknowledged that professional golfers had benefited financially from the competition.

McIlroy had said the same thing ahead of the 2026 US Open.

Bryson DeChambeau has also hinted at something similar. Although he didn’t put it that way, during his interview with Raj Shamani, DeChambeau said management wasn’t running the organization effectively. That’s the kind of bad advice that McGinley is speaking about.

This difference is important because team golf is not necessarily the problem here.

Although McGinley’s criticism of LIV’s team format is a major part of his assessment, the league’s failure should not automatically be treated as proof that team golf cannot work.

Golf has several successful team competitions.

The Ryder Cup remains one of the sport’s most popular competitions. Similarly, the Presidents Cup and other international team events attract significant interest.

LIV itself demonstrated that certain markets responded positively to its events. However, creating recognizable teams and generating lasting fan loyalty required more than recruiting established golfers.

Those objectives required a strong combination of sporting interest, media exposure, sponsorship revenue, and player commitment. But as Alan Shipnuck put it in a conversation on Dan on Golf, golfers abandoned the league.

“It was the players, and for all their lip service about how much they love team golf and how they were growing their international markets and the camaraderie. They had a chance to save LIV. All they had to do was pledge their loyalty,” he said. “But these guys, as soon as the money dried up, they all ran for the hills.”

The league made progress in some areas but failed to develop a commercial structure capable of supporting its financial commitments.

McGinley’s criticism therefore extends beyond a failed sporting venture. It raises a fundamental question about the difference between having enough money to challenge an established organization and having the commercial foundations to replace it.